Week 12
There were a lot of
great ideas presented this week. I bumped into the problem of agreeing
and relating to most of them, but they were presented as competing
philosophies. I found myself attempting to reconcile my thoughts,
and that ultimately changed how I view Being.
Heidegger (1977)
viewed being as having an “I” that is the culmination of one’s historical
past. It views itself against the future, and it is fully interactive
with the environment. Levinas suggests there is no “I”, but a
collection preconscious experiences that are not attached to ego or
intention.
Kristeva also speaks
to preconscious states as we tend to feel our emotions first and then fill them
in with reason. I not only agree with Kristeva, but our cultural shortfall
is allowing ourselves to be emotionally confused by others rather than
developing our emotional skills, and then listening to them.
Mickunas,
through Merlau-Ponty, suggests communication manifests from our physical
orientation using our bodies as the center of our world and sensory experience.
Mickunas is difficult to ignore due to the volume of language that uses
spatial, bodily and sensory references.
I agree with these
thoughts, but according to Levinas and Mickunas, I cannot. Heidegger’s being
is formed through historical context that forms an “I” at the
center of being, while Levinas and Mickunas rejects an “I.” However,
Levinas and Mickunas then go on to describe communication with the world in
similar fashions as Heidegger’s use of historical context. It
was a bit confusing for me.
A questioned popped
into my mind: Why can’t our being be dynamic? I’m not always thinking
about myself as being, or “I.” In fact, I think I walk around most of the
day like Levinas, Kristeva and Mickunas might suggest. However, there are
times when my being snaps into form and I’m aware of myself relative to
whatever is confronting me, and I’m consciously evaluating possibilities for
resolution. In many ways, it feels like Levinas and Mickunas are speaking
to the unconscious, and Heidegger is speaking to the conscious.
Aristotle and
Heidegger (1977) looked to a singular form of being that prevailed over the
other forms of being. Levinas and Mickunas are speaking to being without
ego, but again, this is a singular view of existence. I’m thinking
being is the totality of several modes of thought, much in the same way a
rainbow is the totality of the range of colors. Being seems central to
the Philosophy of communication because it defines how we interpret and share
our view of reality. My interpretations might be off, but for now, they
are my interpretations and I need a dynamic model of Being in order to
synthesize all of these great thoughts in a manner that makes sense to me.
References
Bergo. B. (2007).
Ethical selfhood: Emmanuel Levinas’s contribution to a philosophy of
communication. In P. Arneson (Ed). Perspectives on Philosophy of Communication
(pp. 113-134). West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1977).
Basic Writings. New York: HarperCollins.
Mickunas, A. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty: communicative practice. In P. Arneson (Ed). Perspectives on
Philosophy of Communication (pp. 139-161). West Lafayette: Purdue University
Press.
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